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Taking the different uses of the enantiosemic and ambitransitive verb
as indicative of the human’s fraught relationship with its environment
and itself, it analyses multiple ways in which ‘weathering’ can in-
volve subject–object relations, objectless subject–predicate relations,
or even subjectless processes, and proposes to think them with mech-
anics, thermodynamics, and chaos theory.
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Weathering Ambivalences
Between Language and Physics
CHRISTOPH F. E. HOLZHEY
INTRODUCTION
Proverbially unpredictable, the weather presents many challenges and
ambivalences both on the level of (human) language and of (nat-
ural) science. Many languages have a particular, rather peculiar class
of ‘weather verbs’, which are arguably as ‘ill-behaved’ as the weather
itself. Nothing seems more banal than to speak about the weather,
wondering whether it will be warm or cool today, whether it will rain
or storm. Yet, linguists still discuss the ‘it that does the raining in Eng-
lish and many other languages’.1 They ask, for instance, whether ‘it’
is a dummy, expletive pronoun or whether ‘it’ refers rather to an ‘all-
encompassing’, ‘total environment’.2 Perhaps this wavering between
1 Ronald W. Langacker, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, 2 vols (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 1991), ii: Descriptive Application, p. 365, quoted by Beth Levin
and Bonnie Krejci, ‘Talking about the Weather: Two Construals of Precipitation
Events in English’, Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics, 4.1 (2019), Art. 58, pp.
1–29 (p. 1) <https://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.794>.
2 Dwight Bolinger,Meaning and Form, English Language Series, 11 (London: Longman,
1977), pp. 78, Dwight Bolinger, ‘Ambient It Is Meaningful Too’, Journal of Linguistics,
9.2 (1973), pp. 261–70 (p. 261) <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022226700003789>,
and Wallace L. Chafe, Meaning and the Structure of Language (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 101–02.
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all and nothing should be taken as an indication that the subject of
the weather is an ill-posed question. Indeed, what Noam Chomsky
calls the ‘weathering-it’ conjures up the kind of ‘grammatical habit’ and
‘seduction of language’ that Friedrich Nietzsche insistently considered
as the source of misguided beliefs.3 Following Nietzsche’s reasoning,
the question of the (grammatical) subject of weather verbs can indeed
be said to transport an erroneous and detrimental dualism that takes
all change, alteration, and becoming to be conditioned and caused by
a radically different, separate subject — essentially the Cartesian ego
conceived as substance, being, and free will.
Correcting the Cogito by an ‘it thinks’ is insufficient for Nietzsche,
insofar as the doing remains doubled by a fictive doer — leading to
3 Noam Chomsky,Lectures onGovernment andBinding, Studies in Generative Grammar,
9 (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1981), pp. 324–25; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche,
Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. by Adrian Del Caro, The
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, 8 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2014), Beyond Good and Evil, §17, p. 19 and Genealogy of Morality, i-13, p. 236. To
quote the passages to which I will return more fully, Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good
and Evil (1886): ‘it is a falsification of the facts to say: the subject “I” is the condition
of the predicate “think.” It thinks: but that this “it” is precisely that old famous “ego” is
only an assumption, an assertion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate
certainty.” In fact too much is already claimed with this “it thinks”: even this “it”
contains an interpretation of the process and doesn’t belong to the process itself. Here
the concluding is done according to grammatical habit, namely “thinking is an activity,
to every activity belongs something that is active, therefore— .” Following basically the
same scheme, the older atomism looked at every effective “force” for that little particle
of matter in which it resides, and from which it produces effects, that is, the atom;
more rigorous minds finally learned to do without this “earth residuum,” and perhaps
someday we will even accustom ourselves, logicians included, to doing without this
little “it” (into which the honest old ego has vanished)’ (§17, p. 19). In On Genealogy
of Morality (1887), Nietzsche further expands on this ‘grammatical habit’, referring
to the ‘seduction of language (and the basic errors of reason petrified in it), which
understands and misunderstands all effecting as conditioned by something that effects,
by a “subject.” For instance, just as ordinary people separate lightning from its flashing
and take the latter as its doing, as the effect of a subject that is called lightning, so too
popular morality separates strength from the expressions of strength, as if behind the
strong one there were an indifferent substratum free to express strength or not to. But
there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind the doing, effecting, becoming;
the “doer” is merely tacked on as a fiction to the doing — the doing is everything.
The people basically double the doing when they have the lightning flashing; this is
a doing-doing: it posits the same occurrence once as cause and then once more as its
effect. Natural scientists do no better when they say “force moves, force causes” and
so on — despite all its coolness, its freedom from affect, our entire science still stands
under the seduction of language and has not gotten rid of the false changelings foisted
upon it, the “subjects” (the atom for instance is such a changeling, likewise the Kantian
“thing in itself”)’ (pp. 236–37).
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a redundant ‘doing-doing’ as he notes in a related text, which takes
the common separation of ‘lightning from its flashing’ as example for
language foisting in subjects everywhere. Suggesting that the natural
sciences succumb to the same seduction when they speak of forces that
move and are to be localized in matter, Nietzsche claims that ‘more
rigorous minds finally learned to do without this “earth-residuum”’,
and looks forward to the day when we ‘accustom ourselves, logicians
included, to doing without this little “it” (into which the honest old
ego has vanished [zu dem sich das ehrliche alte Ich verflüchtigt hat])’.4
However, such attempts at overcoming the last anthropo-
morphism — even in impersonal weather verbs with expletive
or all-encompassing subjects — risk reinforcing anthropocentric
oppositions and generating new human, or indeed overhuman,
figures. If talking about the weather is a well-tried manner of
establishing sociality, the unpredictable power of the elements,
weather conditions, or atmospheric agencies conjure up an abyss
of chaos as the sublime ground for (re)newed constitutions of the
human.
As I shall suggest, such an anthropogenic function of the weather
is sedimented in the verb ‘to weather’ insofar as this verb seems to
be the precise obverse of impersonal weather verbs: in its manifold
and multivalent uses, it takes for granted the activity and effects of the
elements and considers them as implicit, impersonal background for
subjects that are always human or, at least, anthropocentric.
At the same time, I will argue that if weathering has a semantic
history that is anthropocentric, its multivalent grammar also points
to a process of weathering that not only precedes oppositions of sub-
ject and object, culture and nature, or language and science but that
can also be understood as the ground from which such oppositions
emerge. And while language may not be able to do without the subject,
reading the ambivalences of linguistic weathering with those of sci-
entific weathering opens the possibility of re-working time-honoured
4 Ibid., p. 19. Walter Kaufmann’s translates the bracket as ‘which is all that is left of the
honest little old ego’, which suggests to my mind more accurately that the ego is still
present in this ‘it’. See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude
to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. by Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Vintage
Books, 1989), §17, p. 24.
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dualistic oppositions so that they come to matter otherwise, that is,
in a less anthropocentric manner. The idea here is not that science
can avoid the linguistic predicate-subject separation, which tends to
substantialize the subject even before it is opposed to an object, but
rather that physics, for instance, in seeking to model unpredictable
phenomena on the basis of natural laws, conjures up other kinds of
‘subjects’, which may help keep the grammatical subject from default-
ing into an emphatic human subject.5
CO-CONSTITUTIVE WEATHERING
In their 2014 article ‘Weathering: Climate Change and the “Thick
Time” of Transcorporeality’, Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen
Walker propose to create ‘weathering’ as a concept ‘to counter the
fallacy of a bifurcated understanding of “nature” and “culture” — or
of weather and humans’.6 They draw on feminist new materialist and
posthumanist approaches that highlight the fundamental entangle-
ment, mutual imbrication, and inseparability of ‘human and nonhu-
man natures’.7 In particular, they invoke Stacy Alaimo’s notion of
‘transcorporeality’, which stresses ‘the extent to which the substance
of the human is ultimately inseparable from “the environment”’,8 and
propose an ‘understanding of ourselves as weather bodies’:9
We seek to cultivate a sensibility that attunes us […] toward
ourselves and the world as weather bodies, mutually caught
up in the whirlwind of a weather-world, in the thickness of
climate-time. In short, as weathering.10
5 In other words, the general strategy could be described as countering a dualism
of substance, which would oppose the human to the nonhuman, by a dualism of
method — or more precisely a complementary of methods, which takes the risk of
universalizing both anthropomorphism (or vitalism) and mechanism in order to attend
in either case to the emergence of differences that have not been pre-supposed.
6 Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering: Climate Change and the
“Thick Time” of Transcorporeality’,Hypatia, 29.3 (2014), pp. 558–75 (p. 560) <https:
//doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12064>.
7 Ibid., p. 563
8 Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 2 cited by Neimanis and Loewen Walker,
‘Weathering’, p. 563.
9 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 560.
10 Ibid., p. 561.
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Neimanis and Loewen Walker seek to radicalize their notion of weath-
ering further by drawing on Karen Barad’s theory of ‘intra-action’,
according to which separable entities (onto)logically do not precede
their relations but co-emerge through them. While Alaimo’s transcor-
poreality allows for relations of contiguity, continuity, or immersion,
they maintain that intra-action clarifies the claim that ‘humans and
nonhuman climate and weather phenomena are co-constitutive. We
are mutually emergent, coextensive. Together, weweather the world.’11
Moving from ‘Transcorporeal Weather’ to ‘Transcorporeal Tem-
poralities’, Neimanis and Loewen Walker enlist the notion of intra-
action to radicalize the collapse and co-constitution of distinctions
even further and extend them to space, time, and matter. The principal
target remains the belief that human bodies can be separated from their
environment. They had already made the intriguing and subtle sugges-
tion that it is not enough to speak of immersion: ‘the weather and the
climate are not phenomena “in” which we live […] but are rather of us,
in us, through us.’12 Referring to Claire Colebrook’s observation that
‘our attempts to externalize climate deny the fact that we are already
entangled in its forces and flows’, they now move to a critique of the
‘exteriorization’ and ‘spatialization of time’. In particular, they object
to narratives of sustainability, progress, or apocalypse that ‘rely on a
linear earth time where past, present, and future make up a time-line
of human progression’.13 It is in order to counter such an exterioriza-
tion and spatialization of time that Neimanis and Loewen Walker turn
again to Barad’s notion of intra-action to consider ‘the co-constitutive
functionings of matter and meaning that collapse any notion of distinct
space and time into an “iterative becoming of spacetimemattering”’.14
Shifting attention towards non-spatialized temporalities thus ends up
involving the collapse of all distinctions — of and within space and
time as well as matter and meaning into what one might well call space-
11 Ibid., p. 564.
12 Ibid., p. 559.
13 Ibid., pp. 569 and 567.
14 Ibid., p. 569, quoting Karen Barad,Meeting theUniverseHalfway:QuantumPhysics and
the Entanglement of Matter andMeaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007),
p. 234.
8 WEATHERING AMBIVALENCES
timematteringsemiosis15 — so as to be able to think their intra-active
co-emergent co-constitution.
The move from ‘Transcorporeal Weather’ to ‘Transcorporeal Tem-
poralities’ does not imply that Neimanis and Loewen Walker abandon
weathering. On the contrary, it is meant to lead them deeper into
weathering as ‘the intra-active process of a mutual becoming’ through
which ‘humans and climate change come to matter’. Thus, they make
the striking claim that ‘matter is weathering in its making of temporal-
ity’.16 Such a concept of weathering ‘means to think of bodies as part
and parcel of the making of time […]. Our very bodies, thoughts, ac-
tions, and behaviors make the present, past, and future’.17 Understood
as a ‘making of temporality’, weathering leads them to the provocative
‘claim that we are time’ — or at least to the notion of ‘a time that we
weather together’.18
Time, here, has taken the place of the world in the rallying cry
‘Together we weather the world’. Such formulae are intriguing and
highly suggestive, but upon closer inspection, the sense of weathering
emerging from them is quite ambivalent, difficult to ascertain, and
hard to retain. Indeed, they may serve rather as examples for the dif-
ficulty of fully grasping the ‘profound conceptual shift’ that the notion
of intra-action represents in Barad’s own words. Whereas the more
common idea of ‘interaction’ presumes the ‘prior existence of inde-
pendent entities or relata’, the notion of ‘intra-action’ insists that ‘relata
do not preexist relations’ and claims instead that they ‘emerge through
specific intra-actions’.19 Such a definition of intra-action is both com-
pelling and easily repeated. However, articulating or even just thinking
relations without preexisting relata — or, for that matter, the very no-
tions of ‘preexisting’, ‘preceding’, or processes of co-emergence without
a linear (temporal or logical) order — remains hard without getting
seduced by the duplications, separations, and reifications of language.
15 Other than ‘spacetimemattering’, Barad often uses ‘ontoepistemological’ and occasion-
ally ‘ethico-onto-epistemology’ (Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 409n10).
16 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, pp. 560 and 569.
17 Ibid., p. 569.
18 Ibid., p. 570.
19 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, pp. 139–40.
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A sentence such as ‘Together, we weather the world’ no doubt
describes a relational process, but insofar as it has a clear subject-
predicate-object structure, it invariably conveys the sense that these
identifiable, distinct elements precede their relation in the sentence. As
Neimanis and Loewen Walker had previously defined ‘weathering’ as
‘mutual worlding’, the sentence should be read as ‘Together, we mutu-
ally world the world’, which becomes even more redundant and tauto-
logical if one remembers that ‘we are the world’ insofar as ‘humans and
nonhuman climate and weather phenomena are co-constitutive’ and
‘we are mutually emergent, coextensive’. In other words, by identifying
the relata preceding the relation, one arrives at a triplicating but also
manifestly circular ‘The world worlds the world’, while what emerges
from the original formulation is not only the separation of ‘we’ from
the ‘world’, but also a subject-object relation with a defiant predicate
resonating well with how weathering is commonly used as a transitive
verb when one says, for instance, ‘the crew weathered the storm’.
My point here is not to criticize some particular, perhaps unfortu-
nate formulations, but rather to note that when invoking intra-action
to emphasize the ontological indeterminacy of anything preceding re-
lations, one should not forget that this is only the premise for the
claim that intra-action is meant to account for the co-constitution of
separable entities. Such co-constituted entities seem to acquire strong,
separable identities — stronger than what is suggested by contiguity,
continuity, or immersion, which intra-action supposedly radicalizes.
Indeed, the process of intra-active co-constitution is often referred
to as a ‘coming to matter’,20 but what is remarkable is that the co-
constitution happens here in and through common language. If ‘To-
gether, we weather the world’ has any referent and describes anything,
it is the imaginary of a ‘we’, of a ‘world’, and of their mutual constitution
that the sentence performatively produces. While the notion of intra-
20 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, adopt this pervasive language of mattering
in another formulation that works to equate weathering with intra-active processes: ‘it
is through weathering — the intra-active process of a mutual becoming — that humans
and climate change come to matter’ (p. 560). However, the premise and claim of intra-
action that relata come to matter through the relation rather than preexisting it, is
immediately contradicted by the subsequent sentence offering an alternative definition
by way of conclusion: ‘Weathering, then, is a logic, a way of being/becoming, or a
mode of affecting and differentiating that brings humans into relation with more-than-
human weather’ (p. 560).
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action may well succeed in dispelling the belief in separate entities
being ontologically pre-given, it is far less clear to what extent new-
materialist talk of mattering through intra-active, agential separation
does not yield to the seduction of language of foiling subjects into
everything and doubling or even tripling processes into a doing-doing
or world-worlding world.
Again, there is much to be said for taking the risk of anthropo-
morphizing in order to help balance the alternative risk of anthropo-
centrism, but it requires critical, methodological self-reflection if the
twin risks are to be avoided. The problem with the way in which Nei-
manis and Loewen Walker create the concept of weathering is not
so much that it involves a performative contradiction, which as such
may well be unavoidable if language is always performative and enacts
divisions into separable entities that appear to have pre-existed their
(linguistic) relation.21 Such a temporal entanglement, whereby lan-
guage produces what it presupposes, could well be considered part of
their critique of ‘linear time’ and correspond to the ‘cultivation of the
sensibility of thick time’ they propose and describe. However, what
would warrant critical reflection is the deliberate gesture of ‘concept-
creation’,22 which implies sovereign, anthropocentric subjects that can
create a concept such as ‘weathering’ ex nihilo (even as it explicitly
draws on theoretical sources) and disregard the multiple significations
that centuries of language use have sedimented into that signifier.
Disclaimers here seem insufficient and function rather as disavow-
als, denials, or negations in Sigmund Freud’s sense of Verneinung,23 as
when the authors distance themselves from both anthropomorphism
and human exceptionalism,24 but otherwise quite consistently seek to
reduce distances and deny the relevance of scale, thereby suggesting a
21 For an attempt to move beyond this logic of presupposition arguably characterizing
the experience of language from Aristotle to Derrida, see Damiano Sacco’s chapter ‘The
Weathering of the Trace: Agamben’s Presupposition of Derrida’ in this volume.
22 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 560.
23 Highlighting the difficulty of retain the ambiguity of this term in translation, Jean
Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis (London:
Hogarth, 1973) conclude their entry on negation, Verneinung, (dé)négation by high-
lighting three closely related assertions in Freud’s analysis: ‘taking cognizance of what
is repressed’ and engaging in ‘a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed’, and
‘thinking frees itself from the restrictions of repression’ (p. 263).
24 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, pp. 563–64.
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strict symmetry and even equivalence in relations of mutuality and in
figures such as ‘weather bodies’. In particular, they explicitly question
common distinctions between climate and weather based on different
time-scales and aim ‘to reduce the distance between the enormity of
climate change and the immediacy of our own flesh’, or again they
propose to ‘bridge the distance of abstraction [which they criticize in
climate discourse] by bringing climate change home’.25
Similarly, Barad’s disclaimer that she does not intend to ‘make
general statements […] about all entanglements, nor to encourage
analogical extrapolation from [her] examples to others’26 sits uneasily
with the far-reaching consequences she and others draw from the no-
tion of intra-action as ‘mutual constitution of entangled agencies’. After
all, Barad’s neologism is only spelled out and specified in a precise,
technical sense for the example of quantum diffraction experiments
and their interpretation in terms of Niels Bohr’s particle-wave comple-
mentarity. Barad’s point that quantum entanglement is not limited to
microscopic scales and can therefore apply also on macroscopic scales
in a literal rather than analogical manner, is well taken, but in practice,
when entanglement is invoked to deny the relevance of scale, literality
seems to be a question of language rather than physics.27
Seeking to negotiate between conflicting risks perhaps always runs
the worse risk of disavowal, that is, of glossing over internal tensions,
while reproducing what is to be avoided. Immunizing itself against
critique, disavowal fosters a voluntarist decisionism concerning, for
instance, the question of when separability is to be rejected in favour of
25 Ibid., pp. 562 and 559. The formulation ‘bringing home’ is introduced indirectly
through the initial reference to Rachel Slocum, ‘Polar Bears and Energy-Efficient
Lightbulbs: Strategies to Bring Climate Change Home’, Environment and Planning D:
Society and Space, 22 (2004), pp. 1–26.
26 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 74.
27 In addition to the ‘caveat’ on using weather and climate interchangeably — justified
by suggesting that distinguishing time scales means to ‘promote a spatialized view
of climate time’ — there are further examples of disclaimers that I would read as
disavowals, that is, as acknowledging that there is something to what is explicitly
denied. For instance, there are the caveats that the ‘shift away from the “stop climate
change” temporal narrative is not for us a weakening of possibilities for ethico-political
engagement’ and that their proposal does not seek to ‘denigrate other feminist analyses
of climate change that underline the gendered, racialized, and colonial power politics
at play’ (‘Weathering’, p. 561), or the ‘clarifications’ in which Neimanis and Loewen
Walker distance themselves from holism and from a perspective on processes ‘bound
to the human mind’ (ibid., pp. 570–71).
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inseparable entanglements and when it is to be embraced as the mode
in which anything ‘comes to matter’. In order to negotiate conflicting
risks, it may be better to focus on the opportunities that are in apparent
conflict and envisage the possibility of fully endorsing heterogeneous
accounts, even if they are mutually incompatible and cannot be pic-
tured together. Such a possibility is envisaged by Bohr’s principle of
complementarity, which plays a decisive role in Barad’s inspiring ad-
vancement of the diffractive methodology that Donna J. Haraway had
proposed as alternative to ‘reflection’. While I find the development
of an ontology of indeterminate matter through a method of comple-
mentary diffraction compelling, I would highlight that this approach
crucially relies on disparate scales and insist on retaining the method
across different scales and fields rather than extrapolate the ontology
linearly or even simply unchanged. In particular, it may be productive
to think of the relation between the weather and human bodies, nature
and culture, physics and language as entangled and perhaps even in
some sense as intra-active, but not in the same sense in which electrons
are entangled and materialize through the measurement process: un-
like entangled electrons, each side of the relation has already come to
matter — if anything ever does.
The weathering article by Neimanis and Loewen Walker makes it
admirably transparent that the appeal of new-materialist theories and
notions such as intra-action often lies in opening up possibilities by
enabling a ‘new imaginary’ — a way to ‘reimagine our bodies’, ‘reima-
gine climate change’, and ‘reimagining our literal inextricability from
that towards which we are called to respond’ — rather than in provid-
ing a less human-centred, somehow more direct account of matter.
No doubt, the ‘reimagination of ourselves as weather bodies […] is
already a politics’.28 However, it is more difficult to see how a politics
of reimagination and intensive feeling can be reconciled as such with
the declared premises and aims of new-materialist and posthumanist
approaches, such as the explicit critique of human exceptionalism and
of the bifurcation of nature and culture. At least in its general outline,
it ultimately seems rather to be a fully anthropocentric, humanist, even
idealist politics. Perhaps in response to such reservations, the 2018
28 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 572.
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article ‘Weathering’, which Neimanis co-authored with Jennifer Mae
Hamilton, appears more anchored and explicit in associating weath-
ering with ‘specific feminist, antiracist and decolonial intersectional
attentiveness’.29 For instance, it exemplifies its expanded, ‘naturalcul-
tural’ understanding of the weather by making contact with Christina
Sharpe’s notion of weather as ‘totality of our environments’ and ‘total
climate’ characterized as ‘antiblack’, and helpfully situates weathering
‘between the neo-liberal heroics of resilience and the victim politics
of vulnerability’.30 In these contexts, the image of intra-active, co-
constitutive weathering is particularly provocative, and while probing
its specific political potential falls beyond the purview of this chapter, I
will concentrate on exploring its logic both on the level of language and
on the level of physical reality to which Barad’s argument lays claim.
WEATHERING THE DICTIONARY
Creating weathering as a concept of co-constitutive worlding is
provocatively counter-intuitive insofar as both ‘co-constitution’ and
‘worlding’ suggest constructive processes. Even if one takes these
processes also as undermining the autonomy of the subject, the most
common use of the noun ‘weathering’ is rather more destructive: The
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines the noun as the ‘action
of the atmospheric agencies or elements on substances exposed to
its influence; the discoloration, disintegration, etc. resulting from
this action’.31 However, especially the verb ‘to weather’ is actually
remarkably ambivalent. Now usually associated with disintegration,
deterioration, and decay — or at least the risk thereof — its first
meaning was ‘1. to subject to the beneficial action of the wind and
sun; to air’.32 The subentries in the OED indicate that ‘weathering’
29 Astrida Neimanis and Jennifer Mae Hamilton, ‘Open Space Weathering [sic, according
to the journal’s citation recommendation]’, Feminist Review, 118.1 (2018), pp. 80–84
(p. 83) <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41305-018-0097-8>.
30 Neimanis and Hamilton, ‘Weathering’, pp. 81 and 83, Christina Sharpe, In the Wake:
On Blackness and Being (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), p. 104.
31 ‘weathering, n.’, in OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) <https://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/226660> [accessed 10 May 2020].
32 ‘weather, v.’, in OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) <https://www.
oed.com/view/Entry/226641> [accessed 22 February 2020].
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was initially understood as a cultural technique encountered in such
diverse contexts as hawking (the ‘sport or practice of chasing birds
or small animals by means of trained hawks’), house- and farm-work
(airing linen, drying harvested crop), or handicraft (exposing clay for
brick- or tile-making).33
While the second meaning is formulated quite neutrally in terms
of a change through exposure, the several sub-entries indicate that a
complete reversal to the weather’s detrimental effects has taken place:
2. To change by exposure to the weather
a. transitive. To wear away, disintegrate, or discolour by atmos-
pheric action. […]
b. intransitive. To become worn, disintegrated, or discoloured
under atmospheric influences. […]
c. In passive, esp. of a crop: To be deteriorated by too long
exposure to bad weather.
d. intransitive. To wear (well or ill) under atmospheric influ-
ences.
The final sub-entry (2d), which could suggest a return to a neutral
sense of change, only serves to confirm the full reversal in relation to
the beneficial weathering of hawking and other cultural techniques.
Indeed, ‘wearing well’ merely seems to mean ‘wearing less badly’, and
the only sample phrase is: ‘For outside work, boiled oil is used, because
it weathers better than raw oil.’
Subsequent entries, which often invoke a nautical context, entail
another kind of reversal without entirely restoring the initial, beneficial
meaning.34 Weathering here refers to the ability to resist or escape
detrimental, even disastrous effects: ‘to get safely round’ (3b), ‘to with-
stand and come safely through (a storm)’ (4a), ‘to sustain without
disaster’ (4b), or ‘to pass through and survive (severe weather)’ (4c).
The previous meaning of weathering as a deteriorating change is im-
plied here as a threat or risk, but the verb is now used in an opposite
sense, namely as successful opposition to such a change.
33 ‘hawking, n.1’, in OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) <https://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/84775> [accessed 6 June 2020].
34 The nautical associations of weathering are emphasized by the Marlon Miguel’s chapter
‘Representing the World, Weathering its End: Arthur Bispo do Rosário’s Ecology of the
Ship’ in this volume.
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The final, rather specialized meanings listed in the OED return to
specific cultural techniques. One of them is directly beneficial, namely
‘6. To set (the sails of a windmill) at the proper angle to obtain the
maximum effect of the wind-force’; while the other one consists again
rather in avoiding detrimental effects, namely the technique in archi-
tecture ‘to slope or bevel (a surface) so as to throw off the rain’ (7).
Of course, many words are polysemic, but the OED definitions
suggest that the verb ‘to weather’ may be regarded, more radically,
as enantiosemic, that is, as having mutually opposite meanings. Such
words, which are their own antonyms, are more common than one
might expect, and include in English, for instance, ‘to cleave’ (to adhere
or separate), ‘to sanction’ (to approve or penalize/boycott), or ‘to rent’
(to purchase use of something or sell it).35 The verb ‘to weather’ is even
more peculiar insofar as it can be said to be doubly enantiosemic and
confound oppositions both of activity and quality: Usually signifying
a deteriorating change, it can also mean, on the one hand, successfully
opposing such a change and, on the other hand, undergoing a benefi-
cial change.
While context often clarifies the intended meaning, the coinci-
dence of opposites in a single word remains highly unstable. Some-
times, enantionyms are true homonyms, that is, words that have
different etymological origins and just happened to have become
homographs and homophones in the course of linguistic evolution.36
But the possibility of opposite meanings coming together in a word
through condensation, contraction, reduction, or equivocation can
also be indicative or evocative of a generative kernel from which
such oppositions have emerged in the first place and from which
diverse meanings continue to emerge. The puzzling, vertiginous im-
plications of such productivity appears reflected in the ongoing pro-
liferation of terms proposed to name this category of words: from
‘Janus word’, which seems to be the only one to have found its way
into the OED, to ‘self-antonym’, ‘auto-antonym’ or ‘autantonym’, ‘con-
35 Mark Nichol, ‘75 Contronyms (Words with Contradictory Meanings)’ <https://
www.dailywritingtips.com/75-contronyms-words-with-contradictory-meanings/>
[accessed 15 June 2020]. The list includes ‘Weather: To withstand, or to wear away’.
36 See ‘Janus Words’, Online Etymology Dictionary (2019) <https://www.etymonline.
com/columns/post/janus-words> [accessed 15 June 2020]. An often-cited example
is ‘to cleave’.
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tronym’ or ‘contranym’, as well as ‘enantionym’, ‘enantiadrome’, and
‘antagonym’.37 Going further back, there is the notion of ‘primal
words [Urworte]’, Carl Abel’s thesis of their ‘antithetical meaning [Ge-
gensinn]’, and the analogy that Sigmund Freud establishes with the
logic and language of dreams.38 Highlighting that a ‘no’ does not seem
to exist for dreams, which ‘feel themselves at liberty, […] to represent
any element by its wishful contrary’, Freud notes:
[T]he most ancient languages behave exactly like dreams in
this respect. In the first instance they have only a single word
to describe the two contraries at the extreme ends of a series
of qualities or activities […]; they only form distinct terms
for the two contraries by a secondary process of making small
modifications in the common word [Urwort].39
Without necessarily endorsing Abel’s and Freud’s claims concerning
the historical evolution of languages and acknowledging that many
enantiosemic words have separate etymologies that only happened to
converge into single words, I maintain that the double enantiosemy
of ‘to weather’ is more than a contingent, historical accident. Instead,
my suggestion is that it is indicative of an undecidability that lies
at the heart of the fraught relationship humans entertain with their
environment and allows for manifold articulations. While such an
understanding of weathering resonates with the concept Neimanis
and Loewen Walker develop by drawing on contemporary theories
of transcorporeality and intra-action, I consider it as a case less of
‘concept-creation’ than of learning from the experience and peculiar
logic sedimented and implied in the word’s enantiosemic uses. If the
appeal of weathering lies in its generativity and beneficial potentials,
37 Cf. Burcu I. Karaman, ‘On Contronymy’, International Journal of Lexicography, 21.2
(2008), pp. 173–92 <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijl/ecn011>, David-Antoine Williams,
‘Poetic Antagonyms’, The Comparatist, 37.1 (2013), pp. 169–85 <https://doi.org/10.
1353/com.2013.0009>.
38 Carl Abel, Über den Gegensinn der Urworte (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich,
1884) and Sigmund Freud,TheStandard Edition of the Complete PsychologicalWorks of
Sigmund Freud, 24 vols (London: Hogarth, 1953–74), iv:The Interpretation of Dreams
(1900) (1953), p. 318.
39 Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 318–19. Concerning primal words, Freud also
suggests that what is today symbolically related was ‘probably united in prehistoric
times by conceptual and linguistic identity’ and draws on Hans Sperber’s thesis on the
sexual reference of all primal words (p. 352).
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a critical question is understanding the conditions under which the
effects of weathering may reverse from detrimental to beneficial and
may open possibilities beyond such cultural techniques as hawking and
setting sails. The weather sciences and ultimately physics are no doubt
indispensable for understanding the conditions of beneficial weather-
ing, but the conditions are also a matter of politics, of socio-economic
and cultural values, of psychology, and ultimately of language, which
structures thought and experience. While this chapter remains focused
on weathering’s language, I seek to develop it in ways that may resonate
and interfere with its physics.
ANTHROPOCENTRIC GRAMMAR OF WEATHERING
Whereas the OED traces the historical development of word use,
the Merriam-Webster dictionary (MWD) takes a more systematic,
grammatical approach. It distinguishes on a first, hierarchical level
between transitive and intransitive uses of the verb, and then, on a
second level, between two transitive meanings:
transitive verb
1: to expose to the open air: subject to the action of the
elements
2: to bear up against and come safely through
//weather a storm
//weather a crisis
[3] intransitive verb
: to undergo or endure the action of the elements.40
This scheme can help clarify the grammar of weathering by being more
consistent than the OED, which likewise organizes different meanings
on two levels and foregrounds the transitive/intransitive distinction,
but uses this distinction on both levels and entangles it with other cat-
egories such as ‘passive’ or even ‘figurative’, ‘nautical’, and ‘architecture’.
For example, the OED entries one and four have the heading ‘transi-
tive’ and five is entitled ‘intransitive’, while three is entitled ‘nautical’
40 ‘Weather’, in Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster,
2020) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/> [accessed 20 February 2020].
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and has subheadings ‘3.a. transitive’, ‘3.d. intransitive’, and ‘3.b. figur-
ative’.41 Clearly, ‘figurative’ or ‘nautical’ exclude neither each other nor
the categories of ‘transitive’ or ‘intransitive’. Indeed, in this case the
figurative use ‘to get safely round’ is not just transitive but corresponds
well to Merriam-Webster’s second transitive meaning of ‘to bear up
against and come safely through’.
The simplicity of the MWD scheme is deceptive and would require
considerable commentary to unfold all its implications. No doubt, the
historical use of weathering is richer and more nuanced, but I would
like to give some indications of how the MWD’s compact grammatical
scheme suggests another story, one that is less historical than logical,
reductive, but also constructive, ultimately leading to a generative ker-
nel of indistinction and the possibility of as yet uncommon uses.
The compact three-fold definition formalizes well the double re-
versal from beneficial to detrimental exposure via successful resistance
on which I have already remarked. However, what is perhaps most
significant is that the MWD definitions conjure up an anthropocentric
division of nature and culture. The grammatical subject of weathering
indeed always seems to be human or an object of human interest, such
as ships that have weathered storms. It is true that one can also speak
of rocks that weather even if they have no specific human interest.
But although there is a sense in which the activity of the weather or,
more generally, ‘the action of the elements’ are always implied, the
possibility of the elements becoming the subject of weathering is not
envisaged. In other words, weathering is an anthropocentric predicate
insofar as it excludes the weather or the elements as core argument in
the subject function.
One might say that weathering denies the agency of the elements
by excluding them from the subject position, but my claim concerning
the anthropocentric bias of weathering needs to be articulated more
carefully. After all, one could say that the elements are excluded as sub-
jects only because their action is taken for granted and already implied
in the predicate ‘to weather’. Yet, as already mentioned, a characteris-
tically anthropocentric mode of relating to nature is precisely to take
41 Altogether, the OED has seven headings on the first level and fifteen subheadings on
the second level. Some first level entries have no subdivision and others as many as
four.
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nature for granted as a (back)ground for the figure of the human and
their actions.42 This also means that emphasizing the activity or even
agency of nature is insufficient to counter anthropocentrism. There
is indeed good reason to maintain that the elements are the primary
source of all weathering activities, while humans are at best reactive if
not entirely passive. But such a simple reversal of activity and passivity
merely re-affirms the anthropocentric nature-culture divide as long as
it involves predicates that enforce that divide. In other words, weath-
ering is anthropocentric not because it denies agency of the weather as
such — it does not preclude the existence of other predicates taking the
weather as active subject — but insofar as it is premised upon a divide
such that the weather is contained in the predicate (and possibly other
arguments the predicate controls), but excluded as subject.
This analysis of weathering’s anthropocentric bias indicates a pos-
sible strategy for countering it, namely to insist that there is no pre-
given divide that would preclude the weather as subject of different
forms of weathering; to expand accordingly the use of weathering at the
risk of anthropomorphism; and thereby to allow for an exploration of
how nature and culture may be understood as more entangled and/or
became separated through weathering.
The OED actually allows for such an expanded use of weathering
with some qualifications. As already mentioned, it includes the transi-
tive use 2a ‘to wear away, disintegrate, or discolour’ and gives a couple
of examples in which atmospheric phenomena or processes such as
clouds, smoke, or percolation do the weathering.43 At the same time
it notes that the verb is then ‘chiefly in passive’, meaning that the agent
42 Cf. Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, which repeatedly opposes the ten-
dency to externalize weather or climate: ‘When we hold onto the belief that we can
separate our human bodies from climate (close our doors, resist the winds), we main-
tain a worldview of relating to the earth, rather than worldingwith it. As Colebrook has
argued, our attempts to externalize climate deny the fact that we are already entangled
in its forces and flows’ (p. 567, emphasis in the original); ‘The consequence of time’s
exteriorization is that, we, as bodies, are conceived as only ever in time, subject to
forces that carry on beyond and outside of us. The weather/environment serves only
as background, thus making for a particular mode of relating to the earth, as though
human beings are somehow separate from the natural elements’ (p. 568).
43 The sample phrases are: ‘The rain-cloud hangs low..overhead; the smoke hovers
around; and they weather the fines sculptured surface’ and ‘It [sc. percolation] acts also
very powerfully in weathering the rocks through which the water passes’ (‘weather, v.’,
in OED Online; ellipsis and square bracket in the original).
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is in a peripheral function or omitted entirely: the rock is weathered
by persistent rain or it is weathered tout court.44 While one sees here
how the agency of the weather is at once presumed and pushed into
the background, this is only the beginning of what becomes visible
and available to analysis when this less common use of weathering is
included. In particular, I would like to ask to what extent this use of
weathering is distinct from the other uses or can be related to them,
and ultimately what the different weathering verbs have in common
other than their name.
AMBIVALENT WEATHERING OF A STORM
I propose to augment the three-fold scheme of the Merriam-Webster
dictionary by explicitly adding the missing transitive use of weathering,
which takes the weather or the elements as subject, and place it along-
side the second transitive meaning of weathering (see Table 1 below).
Sample sentences of these two uses have the same basic subject-
predicate-object structure and differ only insofar as the weather is,
in one case, the object and, in the other, the subject. Corresponding
formally to a simple interchange of subject and object, they can be
combined into a single, seductively simple sentence, such as: ‘I weather
the storm as the storm weathers me.’45 This sentence could well be
taken as paradigmatic for a transitive sense of weathering that relates
nature and culture without being anthropocentric. Indeed, the sen-
tence suggests symmetry, relationality, mutuality, perhaps even a form
of co-constitution.
44 Of the seven examples for this entry 2a, only the two quoted in the previous footnote
are in the active voice. Curiously, the transitive definition 2a itself already has the
‘atmospheric action’ in a peripheral position: ‘to wear away […] by atmospheric action’
or indeed ‘to change by exposure to the weather’. It is as if the transitive subject were
here not atmospheric action or the weather but once again human beings, that is, as
if the whole second definition were ultimately just the malignant counter-part to the
first definition of ‘subjecting to the beneficial action of the wind and sun’.
45 Note that dictionaries tend to define verbs without specifying the subject, as if the
verbs could be universally used for any subject, while they do often specify the kind
of object that comes with certain uses: ‘to air (linen, etc.)’, ‘to expose (land, clay for
brick- or tile-making)’, ‘To set (the sails of a windmill)’, ‘to slope or bevel (a surface)’,
etc. In order to mark the anthropocentrism veiled by the universalism of the subject,
I find it necessary to specify not only the object but also the implied subject, using in
this case ‘I’ and ‘the storm’.
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However, there is something instructively wrong here — not in
the introduction of posthumanist weathering nor in the sentence com-
bining it with the more common, anthropocentric transitive use, but in
being led astray by the polysemy of both the predicate ‘weathering’ and
the conjunction ‘as’, which here should be read temporally or causally
rather than as establishing an equivalence. I may manage to weather the
storm while it weathers me, but I do not weather it ‘just as’ it weathers
me.
The suggestion of symmetrical co-constitutional relations is ac-
tually plausible for similar sentences with predicates such as fighting
or attracting: A arguably cannot fight, attract, or repel B if B does not
also fight, attract, or repel A — at least not if one understands such
verbs in a mechanical sense cohering with Isaac Newton’s third law
‘actio=reactio’: every action not only elicits a reaction but is precisely
equal (and opposite) to it, which means, among other things, that
neither comes first, and it is arbitrary which one is called action and
which reaction. A simple example would be the mutual gravitational
attraction between earth and moon, or the (electromagnetic) repul-
sion preventing a building from falling to the centre of the earth and
keeping it on the ground.
However, applying Newton’s third law can be tricky. The law
resonates strangely with Michel Foucault’s dictum ‘[w]here there is
power, there is resistance’ and with his relational understanding of
force and power that views resistance as a condition for power relations
rather than a passive reaction to a power that that would precede it.46
Yet, a balance of attractive and repulsive forces between two bodies
by no means implies that a building could not collapse under its own
weight. Two different kinds of forces, such as gravity and electromag-
netism (ensuring rigidity), are at work here, and there is no law of
equality or reciprocity for their relationship. Instead, they are quite
independent from one another, each action eliciting a reaction in the
other body, and there is equilibrium only if and when they balance each
other out.
46 Cf. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon, 1978), i: An
Introduction, pp. 92–97.
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I may weather the storm while it weathers me, but there is no guar-
antee that I will succeed: although the two instances of weathering in
this sentence are equally transitive, they do not only exchange subject
and object but also have no necessary relationship between them. [To
this extent we are far from being coextensive, let alone co-constitutive.]
The deceptive symmetry can be grasped even more compactly through
the ambivalent formulation of ‘the weathering of a storm’. Grammat-
ically, the genitive can be subjective or objective, that is, it can be the
agent or the patient to yield a storm that weathers things or a storm
that is being weathered. There may be symmetry in grammar but there
is none in the action. The difference here is not so much in scale — a
storm is generally much larger than anything that may weather it — but
in kind: a storm threatens everything within its scope with death and
destruction, whereas that which weathers the storm only saves itself
and need have no effect on the storm.
Transitive weathering thus splits into two meanings that are quite
independent from one another even if they are equally relational and
mutually opposed. To make this explicit, one could write as defin-
ing phrase ‘2α I weather the storm while 2β the storm weathers me’.
The grammatical reversibility of weathering — the possibility of in-
terchanging subject and object in its transitive use — therefore does
not imply relations of symmetry, mutuality, and co-constitution, as
it does with verbs for fighting or mutual attraction and repulsion. In-
stead it is the result of weathering’s specific enantiosemy that makes
it appear as its own reciprocal complement. What I mean by this
is that transitive weathering behaves in many ways like predicates
that change into a contrary, reciprocal predicate when their subject
is interchanged with another argument and that form couples such as
‘attack–defend’, ‘inflict–suffer’, or ‘show–watch’, except that it takes the
same word for both meanings. In other words, the grammatical revers-
ibility of weathering implies the couple ‘2αweathering–2βweathering’,
where 2αweathering involves self-preservation, sustained identity, and
survival, and 2βweathering denotes destruction, disintegration, and
death. Reducing even further, an equation of life and death could be
said to lie at the core of weathering’s enantiosemy.
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FANTASY AND WEATHERING WEATHERING
Insisting on transitive weathering as enantiosemic and split into two
different meanings is ambivalent insofar as it can both re-enforce onto-
logical divisions and suggest different strategies of countering them.
The division is reproduced if the contrary meanings are understood to
be uniquely determined by the subject, that is, if a human(-centred)
subject implies self-preserving 2αweathering and an atmospheric sub-
ject implies destructive 2βweathering. However, the division is under-
mined by insisting not merely on the atmosphere’s agency, but on
the possibility of human and non-human agents each being capable of
being the subject of both 2αweathering and 2βweathering.
The enantiosemy of weathering — joint by common use and
experience — makes it rather difficult to imagine and convey the pos-
sibility that I could weather the storm just as it weathers me, that is,
that I 2βweather it, wear it out, and make it decay; or that the storm
could weather me just as I weather it, that is, that it 2αweathers me,
resists being worn out, and safely comes through all my attempts to
annihilate it.
At the same time, the enantiosemy of weathering may be sug-
gestive in indicating that such exercises in logical permutations and
pedantic differentiations may be unnecessary and that there actually is
a continuity between contrary meanings, that is, that some common,
perhaps non-differentiated, ground exists from which they emerge.
While such a continuity goes counter a logic of non-contradiction and
is therefore hard to think, it can be dreamt and, in some languages, also
said.
What I am proposing here is that the enantiosemy of weathering,
its multiple reversals, and grammar can be read with Freud’s remarks
on antithetical primal words in his Interpretation of Dreams and his
analysis of the vicissitudes of drives, which he tightly links to ‘gram-
matical transformations’.47 At one point, he derives masochism from
sadism, which he considers as a ‘pair of opposites’, through a change
from active to passive aim, which he calls ‘reversal into its opposite’,
and through an interchange of subject and object, which he describes
47 Jean Laplanche,Life andDeath inPsychoanalysis, trans. by Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 143n7.
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in two steps: first, the object of sadism is given up through a ‘turning
round upon the subject’s own self ’ and secondly, another person is
sought to take over the role of the subject. Noting that only the final
stage corresponds to what is commonly called masochism, Freud also
highlights the necessity of assuming the existence of the intermediate
stage, which he explicitly describes in grammatical terms as a change
from the ‘active voice […] not into the passive, but into the reflexive,
middle voice’.48
Jean Laplanche scolds Freud here for clouding his remarkable
grammatical analysis by confusing the reflexive voice (e.g., to hit one-
self) and the middle voice, which is somehow between or beyond the
active and the passive. Unlike Ancient Greek, English and most other
modern language have no verb form for the middle voice, but Romance
languages, for instance, often approximate it through a particular use
of the reflexive. Laplanche invokes the French example ‘se cogner
[to knock oneself]’ and distinguishes between an accidental knocking
oneself against a chair in the dark (corresponding to the middle voice)
and an intentional knocking of one’s head against the walls (which is
more properly reflexive).
While Laplanche privileges the properly reflexive form for its clear
distinction of subject and object over the middle form, where the terms
‘remain in something of a state of coalescence’,49 in the context of my
chapter, the intermediate stage between opposites is most promising
precisely when it coalesces rather than distinguishes subject and ob-
ject, activity and passivity. An intermediate stage characterized by a
‘reflexive, middle voice’ plays a pivotal role also in Freud’s discussion of
the pair of opposites ‘scopophilia [voyeurism]—exhibitionism’, where
he links this stage to a much earlier, autoerotic stage, which he under-
stands as the ‘source of both the situations represented in the resulting
pair of opposites’.50
Questions of original autoeroticism and of a primary, reflexive
masochism have been much debated as Freud remains notoriously
48 Freud, ‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psy-
chological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London:
Hogarth, 1953–74), xiv: On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on
Metapsychology, and Other Works (1914–1916) (1957), pp. 109–40 (pp. 126–28).
49 Laplanche, Life and Death, p. 143n7.
50 Freud, ‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’, p. 130; emphasis in the original.
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— but also overtly — ambiguous, contradictory, or undecided about
them.51 In a beautiful essay on original fantasies, fantasies of ori-
gin, and origins of fantasy, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Betrand Pontalis
have insisted on this question for an understanding of the origin of
sexuality in the properly psychoanalytic sense as a deviation from bio-
logical needs ‘into the field of fantasy’ and/or through a ‘breaking in of
fantasy’.52
Rather than speculating further on the onto- or phylogenetic ori-
gin of an emergent splitting off of a specifically psychoanalytical — and
human — order from the order of nature, I will return to the MWD’s
three-fold anthropocentric definition of weathering and my pairing of
the central transitive definition with a weathering that — at the risk
of anthropomorphizing — takes the elements as subject. Perhaps even
more speculatively, I would like to propose that this scheme can tell
another story, which, rather than by emergent splittings, proceeds by
a progressive reduction that may well end up turning weathering into
a primal weather verb that does not even have a subject.
PROGRESSIVE VALENCY REDUCTION
The story I propose progresses by reducing what linguists call a verb’s
‘valency’. This notion is taken from chemistry, where it indicates the
number of bonds an atom can establish with other atoms such as
hydrogen, and refers to the number of arguments controlled by a
predicate. Transitive verbs are typically divalent — taking a subject
and an object — or trivalent, when they also take an indirect object,
while intransitive verbs are typically monovalent. Most languages have
valency-lowering and valency-raising mechanisms, such as the passive
51 In a footnote added nine years later, in 1924, Freud just comments his rejection of the
existence of primary masochism by saying: ‘In later works […] I have expressed an
opposite view’ (p. 128n2).
52 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, ‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality’, in
Formations of Fantasy, ed. by Victor Burgin, James Donald, and Cora Kaplan (London:
Routledge, 1989), pp. 5–34 (p. 25). The original title, which I paraphrased, is ‘Fan-
tasme originaire, fantasmes de origines, origines du fantasme’, Les Temps Modernes,
19.215 (1964).
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1 I weather a hawk 3
2 α) I weather the storm as β) the storm weathers me 2
3 I weather 1
4 [It] weathers 0
Table 1. Definition of weathering on the basis of the MWD, making the implied
subject explicit, splitting the second definition by adding 2β (see above), and
adding an understanding of weathering as an avalent weather verb (see below). The
number at the end of the lines indicate the verb’s valency.
or reflexive, which lower the valency, or the causative, which raises it:
‘to make someone do something’.53
Like the historically oriented OED, the MWD begins with weath-
ering as a cultural technique. Grammatically, this transitive use of
weathering is divalent: in weathering a hawk or weathering linen there
are two arguments: subject and object. Yet, as the definition ‘to subject
to the action of the elements’ suggests, the verb’s valency is effectively
increased to three. Two agents indeed seem to be present, not only
the grammatical, usually human, subject of the sentence, but also the
weather, the air, the sun, or other atmospheric elements. Although
grammatically divalent, the historically first use of weathering thus
involves a triangulation: to weather hawks or linen means that one has
the weather weather them.
On this view, the second transitive use of weathering involves a
reduction of the number of predicate arguments, leading to a semantic-
ally as well as grammatically binary subject-object relation: to weather
a storm or crisis. However, upon closer inspection, it is hard to see
how this transitive use could be obtained from the first one through
valency-reduction, which points rather to its opposite 2β: I weather a
hawk = I have the elements weather a hawk → the elements weather a
hawk.
53 For an overview of the wide range of valency changing mechanisms and case studies
in different languages, seeChanging Valency: Case Studies in Transitivity, ed. by Robert
M. W. Dixon and Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000).
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Proceeding to the third meaning in the MWD involves a further
reduction of valency. In rocks that weather, there is a subject but no
object and weathering as an intransitive verb is monovalent. Verbs that
can be both transitive and intransitive are sometimes called ‘ambitran-
sitive’ or ‘labile’ verbs.54 But here, too, it is hard to see how such a use
could be derived from the original transitive use 2α, whereas it comes
rather easily from 2β: The storm weathers me = I am weathered by the
storm ≈ I am weathered → I weather. There is something quite remark-
able in the last step from the passive (which is already monovalent) to
the intransitive insofar as grammatically it involves a reversal from the
passive to the active. Yet, it is linguistically not that unusual and is the
mode of valency reduction of so-called ‘patientive ambitransitives’. A
standard example in English is the verb ‘to break’: I break the cup =
The cup is broken by me ≈ The cup is broken → The cup breaks.
Adding the use 2β thus facilitates an understanding of the three-
fold MWD scheme in terms of a progressive reduction of valency. In a
way, this is just the result of 2β making explicit the ‘action of the elem-
ents’, which 1 and 3 take for granted but place in the background. One
might indeed object that if one considered the first use (i.e., weathering
hawks) as trivalent, one should now also say that the intransitive verb
is effectively divalent insofar as the weather remains implied as agent.
In other words, one might say that the use 2β was not entirely absent in
the MWD but effectively contained in 3. If this observation can further
the strategy of countering the anthropocentric nature-culture divide
by insisting on the agency of the elements, I would now like to sug-
gest that there is also something to be said for taking the grammatical
reduction of valency from 2β to 3 more seriously.
While transitivity is premised upon a separation of subject and
object, which easily aligns with nature and culture — regardless of
whether one says ‘I weather the elements’ or ‘the elements weather
me’ — intransitivity can do without a system–environment distinction
and makes no reference to the environment. Is there not indeed a
sense in which everyone and everything weathers and does so ‘by
itself ’, without any particular external influence? This would mean
understanding intransitive weathering not as an implicit or ‘agentless’
54 Ibid., p. 4.
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passive that disavows the ‘action of the elements’, taking it for granted
and placing it in the background, but rather as a kind of reflexive or
middle voice, perhaps as an activity that turns against itself when it
finds no object, or, vice versa and more radically, as an ‘anticausative’
verb from which a subject-object distinction co-emerges without being
implied.55 It could even mean understanding intransitive weathering
as a form of reflexive masochism or, with Freud’s re-articulation of
primary masochism inBeyond the Pleasure Principle, as a manifestation
of the death drive.
Weathering in this sense is a correlate of ageing or the passage of
time, as Romance languages using the same word for ‘weather’ and
‘time’ suggest.56 Even though some things age well and growing up
and maturing are often welcomed, and even though some storms and
crises may be weathered, deterioration, decay, and death appears as
ineluctable fate of all temporal existence. In other words, ‘the action
of the elements’ undergone or endured in intransitive weathering may
well be just a way of speaking of a law of nature. A famous law quickly
comes to mind: the second law of thermodynamics, the law of increas-
ing entropy, which is often invoked to define the arrow of time.
Perhaps there is a good reason, then, that using weathering for
‘the action of the elements’ is uncommon and that this action is taken
for granted or even dismissed. Not only would it be a pleonasm to
say that ‘the weather weathers’, but following Nietzsche one could
insist that the process of weathering is all there is and that a subject
is added only out of grammatical habit producing a ‘doing doing’.
‘The weather’ and ‘the elements’ would then only be abstract fictions
without real existence. All there is then is the process of weathering
55 Cf. Dixon and Aikhenvald on the distinction between the ‘prototypical passive’, where
the agent is named, the ‘agentless passive’, where the agent is implied — ‘the glass is
broken (implied: by someone)’ — and the ‘anticausative’, where an agent is neither
stated nor implied: ‘the glass broke’ (p. 7). (In this case, the object is explicitly assumed
as grammatical subject, and my suggestion of co-emergence gestures already further
towards an avalent ‘it weathers’.) Concerning the term ‘middle’, the authors warn that
it is used with a ‘frightening variety of meanings’ — including the anticausative and re-
flexive — lacks in ‘typological clarity’, and often amounts to a ‘(general) intransitivizer’
(p. 11–12).
56 On the association of weather and time, or weathering and change, see Niccolò Crisafi
and Manuele Gragnolati’s chapter ‘Weathering the Afterlife: The Meteorological Psy-
chology of Dante’s Commedia’ in this volume.
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that takes place in everything — in the elements themselves — without
the intervention of some subject or agent. In other words, weathering
would be an avalent weather verb after all: ‘it weathers’, and even
speaking of an ‘it’ may be already saying too much.
But what about the more positive meanings of weathering: the
possibility of weathering storms and crises, or even the beneficial
actions of the weather? Do they have an intransitive, even avalent cor-
relate or substrate from which they can be imagined to emerge, or are
they in inherently bound to human subjects?
No doubt the positive evaluation of weathering is to a large extent
anthropocentric. The outright beneficial character of the elements in
the first use indeed seems due to cultural mediation — be it because we
channel the actions of the elements, because the weathering is good for
us but not the hawk (not to speak of sun-dried tomatoes or raisins), or
because weathering hawks means temporarily lifting their confinement
and putting them back in their element. Most strikingly, the OED
counts the meaning ‘to expose […] to the pulverizing action of the
elements’ under the rubric ‘to subject to the beneficial action of the
wind and sun’, which sounds violent and could even appear sadistic if
the utility for ‘brick- or tile-making’ were not mentioned in my ellipsis.
However, there is also a sense in which beneficial weathering can
be understood with respect to an entity’s identity, self, or unity as a
system rather than human utility. Garments that are being weathered
lose their odour and other contaminations, making them less suscept-
ible to moths, for instance. Weathering here purifies; it takes off what
is not essential, making the object more durable. Clothes that are dried
in the open air do not rot, nor will grapes and tomatoes, for instance.
Perhaps this weathering takes out some life — or the potential for
unwanted life, like mould — but even disregarding human utility, it
seems distinguishable from entropic processes of disintegration and
dissipation that involve homogenization and a loss of structure and
order. Indeed, it lays bare what persists, such as an underlying structure
otherwise hidden under a superficial, perhaps only ornamental layer
(as it is in plastered buildings or artworks).
In other words, weathering can accentuate a thing’s identity in its
constitutive difference from the environment by enacting the differen-
tiation of that which in it weathers and that which does not. Or, more
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suggestively, weathering constitutes identity by enacting a differenti-
ation between two kinds of weathering, between ‘what 3weathers’ and
‘what 2αweathers the elements’.
Again, one could insist that intransitive 3weathering is really a pas-
sive form that implies the environment as agent and therefore presup-
poses a self that is distinguished from the environment. But one might
also take the valency reduction more seriously and extend instead
the intransitive meanings of weathering. In this way, if I argued that
the ordinary intransitive use of weathering forms with 2βweathering a
patientive ambitransitive pair, 2αweathering could well be considered
part of an agentive ambitransitive pair, where the intransitive simply
omits the transitive object. Examples in English include eating but
also winning. Not only does ‘to come safely through’ — the MWD
definition for 2αweathering — resonate with winning, but it is also
itself intransitive, and perhaps one can hear in intransitive weathering
not just resignation but also defiance: ‘I weather!’.57
With such a doubling of intransitive weathering, a sense of iden-
tity becomes conceivable that relies not on a pre-given distinction
from the environment — the subject-object opposition of transitive
verbs — but that is instead constituted through the internal differ-
entiation of ‘what αaweathers’ and ‘what βpweathers’. The additional
superscript is necessary because one can also imagine another per-
mutation of having the two transitive meanings of weathering enter the
two varieties of ambitransitivity, arriving at both a βaweathering and a
αpweathering of the elements (subjective genitive).58 For a full account
of self-constituted identity that does not rely on ontological divisions,
the intransitive weatherings must not, of course, predetermine their
57 While defiant weathering may provide a (politically) unattractive model insofar as it
approaches ‘neoliberal resilience’ (Neimanis and Hamilton, ‘Weathering’, p. 83) or a
‘macho model’ of subjectivity, which Crisafi and Gragnolati exemplify with Capaneus
in Dante’s Comedy (‘Weathering the Afterlife’, p. 74), one can also think of the gay
anthem during the AIDS pandemic ‘I will survive’, which its singer Gloria Gaynor
adapted in 2017 for hurricane victims into ‘Texas Will Survive’, Twitter, 31 August
2017 <https://twitter.com/gloriagaynor/status/903027825443254273> [accessed 5
July 2020]).
58 If ‘I αaweather’ comes from dropping the object in ‘I αweather the storm’ and ‘I am
being βweathered [by the storm]’ leads to ‘I βpweather’, the storm can βaweather by
dropping the object in ‘The storm βweathers me’ or by turning the passive ‘The storm
is αweathered [by me]’ into an intransitive ‘the storm αpweathers’.
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possible subjects. That is, in principle, one would have to allow for a
fourfold intransitive weathering for both ‘the elements’ and other, in
particular human, subjects, or ultimately just an avalent four-fold ‘it
weathers’.
TOWARDS A PHYSICS OF FOUR-FOLD WEATHERING
No doubt, we have long left behind even less common uses of weath-
ering, and there is also no reason to assume that every verb should be
doubly ambitransitive. However, the combinatorics of valency reduc-
tion on the one hand raises critical questions worth exploring further.
What would it mean if attempts at going beyond fixed subject-object
binaries led to a proliferation of monovalent or eventually avalent
weatherings? Does it suggest that the problem of binaries repeats itself
in a different guise? Or could one take weathering’s enantiosemy —
the use of the same word ‘weathering’ for all the different meanings
that can be kept separate only with considerable analytical effort — as
a hint that weathering defies language, logic, and reason, that one can
only attempt to get to a fuller account by bringing together all these
different, contrary meanings even though they cannot be pictured to-
gether, and that it forms an ultimately ungraspable kernel from which
all the distinctions emerge that are retroactively used to project out
complementary aspects?
On the other hand, I would maintain that the linguistic combina-
torics can be productively related to different material phenomena
and some thorny questions in the history and philosophy of physics. I
have already suggested that thermodynamics and its second law of ir-
reversible entropy production and dissipation strongly resonates with
ubiquitous intransitive weathering, which now should be specified as
βpweathering. However, the second law continues to raise profound
questions and elicit much debate. Insofar as it defines an arrow of
time — an irreversible tendency towards larger entropy, disorder,
equilibrium, and homogeneity — it confirms the intimate connection
between weather and time suggested by Romance languages. As such,
it is arguably necessary for any kind of phenomenal experience.
Yet while often regarded as the most fundamental law, the second
law is alternatively, sometimes even simultaneously, considered as re-
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1 I weather a hawk
2 I αweather the storm The storm βweathers me
3 I αaweather I βpweather /
[the storm] am βweathered [by the storm]
The storm αpweathers / The storm βaweathers
is αweathered [by me] [me]
4 αaweathers βpweathers
[it] αpweathers βaweathers
Table 2. Completing the three MWD definitions of weathering (in bold) by allow-
ing the storm to be the subject and considering both αweathering and βweathering
as both agentive ambitransitives and patientive ambitransitives.
ducible to more fundamental laws at lower scales and/or in profound
conceptual conflict with these laws.59 The basic reason for the conflict
is that physics tends to theorize fundamental laws as reversible and
conservative rather than dissipative, that is, despite its early twentieth-
century revolutions, it continues to follow the paradigm of Newtonian
mechanics and its laws of inertia and conservation, which it extends
from energy and momentum to other quantities and information. The
basic conflict between classical mechanics and thermodynamics can be
aligned with the difference between α-weathering connoting persist-
ence and β-weathering connoting decay, deterioration, and loss. More
precisely, the conflict here corresponds to the difference between
αaweathering (a persisting obtained from the active ‘I αweather [the
storm]’) and βpweathering (a decaying obtained from the passive ‘I am
being βweathered [by the storm]’).
Furthermore, there is the counter-intuitive claim — forcefully ad-
vanced especially by Ilya Prigogine, the 1977 Chemistry Nobel Prize
winner for his work on dissipative structures — that it is the second
59 While the literature on this topic is vast, a helpful point of entry may be Craig
Callender, ‘Taking Thermodynamics Too Seriously’, Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B, 32.4 (2001), pp. 539–53.
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law that accounts for the emergence of order and structure.60 Prigo-
gine’s claim is remarkably hard to grasp in its provocatively general
ramifications. It is often emphasized, for good reasons, that a key point
for making the self-organized order and growth of living organisms
consistent with the second law is to consider them as open systems
that exchange energy with their environment and, more specifically,
discharge more entropy into their surroundings than they ingest.61 To
this extent, one could say that the key insight is that organisms behave
like little storms that βaweather in the form of exhaling, sweating, defe-
cating, and urinating.
However, Prigogine goes further to suggest that self-organization
is not merely compatible with the second law but follows from it, that
is, that a system’s identity and organization emerge and persist thanks
to dissipation. It is as if α-weathering of mechanical persistence were
subsumed under thermodynamic β-weathering and pushed towards
an ambiguous vitalism. Such a move can already be found in Spinoza’s
notion of conatus as a ‘striving to persevere in one’s being’, which is
modelled upon mechanical inertia but tends to retain sense of desire
and teleology of upward progression.62
The basic issue remains how anything can emerge to grow in
the first place. Although the βaweathering verbs of excretion are all
intransitive, they — and the very notion of an open system — all
presuppose a distinction between system and environment. I would
argue that it is therefore misleading to say that a system’s identity and
organization can emerge through dissipation as such, and maintain
instead, as already indicated, that a differentiation between different
modalities of intransitive weathering is required, which can now be
60 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with
Nature (London: Heinemann, 1984).
61 In What Is Life? from 1944, Erwin Schrödinger highlights that ‘an organism feeds on
negative entropy’. While the related notion of ‘negentropy’ remains controversial, the
basic idea is clear: for a self-organizing organism to respect the second law of global
entropy increase, ‘the essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds
in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive’ (Erwin
Schrödinger, What Is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell with Mind and Matter
andAutobiographical Sketches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 71).
62 Cf. Christoph F. E. Holzhey, ‘Conatus Errans: Paradoxe Lust zwischen Teleologie und
Mechanik’, in Conatus und Lebensnot: Schlüsselbegriffe der Medienanthropologie, ed. by
Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky and Anna Tuschling, Cultural Inquiry, 12 (Vienna: Turia
+ Kant, 2017), pp. 66–123.
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specified as a differentiation of persisting αaweathering and dissipative
βaweathering.
Among the most familiar and deceptively simple examples from
physics with which to test out these ideas is the formation of crystals in
a super-cooled liquid. The process depends as much on the formation
of persistent bonds in the emergent solid as on the flow of energy
into the surrounding liquid, where it dissipates to increase the overall
entropy. Furthermore, the liquid keeps threatening to dissolve the nas-
cent crystal again, and it would quickly do so if its relative volume were
not so large that it can easily absorb and dissipate the crystallization
energy without being significantly affected by it. One could well speak
here of a mutual weathering and even of the co-emergence and co-
constitution of ‘things’ and their environment. Indeed, crystallization
provides a model with which to think through the intriguing but hard
to grasp notion of intra-action as process through which separable
entities emerge and materialize in relations without preexisting relata.
The model of crystallization helps understand, for instance, that mutu-
ality, co-extensiveness, and co-constitution need not imply symmetry
or similarity between the emergent entities, nor do they question the
solidity and durable persistence of what emerges. It is helpful in clari-
fying the roles of indeterminacy, virtuality, and contingency, but also
predictability. A closer analysis could thereby help sharpen the larger
claims and expectations attached to such notions as intra-action, co-
emergence, and co-constitution, even if — or rather precisely as —
it may disappoint insofar as the general trajectory is quite predictable
and progresses linearly from homogeneous liquid to immersed crys-
tals, leaving only — though, to be sure, significantly — their actual
location and shape open to a range of variation.
Much the same could be said about the more dynamic phe-
nomenon to which Prigogine repeatedly refers as paradigm for dis-
sipative structures, namely the spontaneous emergence of so-called
Bénard convection cells in a homogeneous layer of liquid that is
heated from below. This model relates in several ways to the multiple,
ambivalent meanings of weathering. Above all, it provides the basic
mechanism for the formation of wind patterns in the earth’s atmos-
phere under the effect of the sun’s influx of heat, which eventually gets
radiated in a more isotropic and entropic form into outer space. But
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its closer analysis also gives an indication of what could be meant by
αpweathering, which in my analysis of the grammatical possibilities
of weathering remained perhaps most obscure: what does it mean to
consider αweathering as a patientive ambitransitive, that is, to say that
the storm αpweathers insofar as it is weathered by me? How could a
storm possibly be affected by my weathering it?
The attempt to model the weather through numerical calculations
of the equations governing atmospheric convection made meteoro-
logist Edward Lorenz a pioneer of so-called chaos theory. Repeating
his computer simulations, Lorenz discovered that the sequence of
convection patterns is extremely sensitive to initial conditions, mak-
ing the weather unpredictable for all practical purposes even when
it is assumed to be governed by fully deterministic and reversible
equations.63 This defining characteristic of chaos as understood in
mathematics and physics — the appearance of randomness and chance
in fully deterministic systems due to sensitivity to initial conditions
— is at the heart of the famous ‘butterfly effect’. As Lorenz himself
highlights in retrospect, this expression has a ‘cloudy history’.64 Often
traced to his 1972 paper entitled ‘Predictability: Does the Flap of a
Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas?’, it refers to the
possibility of small causes having large effects.65 It suggests, in particu-
lar, that what an organism does to persist can have far-reaching effects
— it can even set off a storm somewhere on the globe, or also prevent
it.
As Lorenz notes, ‘Perhaps the butterfly, with its seeming frailty
and lack of power, is a natural symbol of the small that can produce
the great.’66 However, the agency that the butterfly effect attributes
to everything, including the small and meek, is ultimately deeply am-
bivalent: its potentially enormous effects could seem to show the
63 See Edward N. Lorenz, ‘Encounter with Chaos’, in Edward N. Lorenz, The Essence of
Chaos (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp. 111–60, especially ‘Searching’, pp. 130–35.
Lorenz’s chance discovery is dramatized in the opening chapter ‘The Butterfly Effect’
of the best-selling book James Gleick,Chaos:Making aNewScience (London: Cardinal,
1988), which Lorenz credits for having established the butterfly effect as the ‘symbol
for chaos’ (p. 13).
64 Lorenz, Essence of Chaos, p. 14.
65 The talk given in 1972 is published in ibid., pp. 179–82.
66 Ibid. p. 15.
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irrelevance of scale, make everything possible, and even feed fantasies
of omnipotence, but they are utterly unpredictable and knowable only
retroactively. Furthermore, even if an agent knew what it was doing,
any intention, plan, or strategy would be foiled by myriads of equally
powerful and unpredictable agents. Whatever happens ultimately de-
pends on the constellation and behaviour of all agents, which are so
thoroughly entangled as to make the very notion of agency meaning-
less.
If anything, it is the weather that gains agency through the en-
tanglement of zillions of effective butterflies. As everything weathers
the weather, the weather is weathered and therefore could be said
to αpweather in an entirely unpredictable manner, behaving, for all
practical purposes, as if it had a mind of its own. Furthermore, if
αaweathering is above all about self-preservation, survival, and persist-
ing self-identity — the storm figuring only as a grammatical object but
not as the object towards which one’s action is directed — the point of
chaos theory could be said to assert much the same of αpweathering.
Chaos as understood by mathematics and physics is not pure ran-
domness. Instead, it is defined in terms of a causally fully determined
dynamic and involves a peculiar and ambivalent kind of unpredict-
ability. If the figure of the butterfly ultimately established itself for
chaos theory, it is arguably because it symbolizes not only the ‘small
that can produce the great’, but also another defining aspect of chaos,
namely the presence of so-called ‘strange attractors’, which constrain
and govern the apparently random behaviour of chaotic systems. An
attractor represents a small subset of possible configurations or dy-
namic patterns towards which a dynamic system is ‘attracted’ no matter
where it begins. In the simplest case, the attractor is a point, such
as the bottom of a well where a ball will end up whichever way it is
thrown in. The attractors of chaotic systems are ‘strange’ insofar as they
have a very complicated, so-called fractal geometry (Figure 1 shows an
example). This strangeness accounts for the appearance of randomness
as a system will be attracted to a different part of its attractor when the
initial conditions are slightly different. Yet the attractor itself can be
understood as a system’s signature, that is, as a robust, intrinsic telos
towards which the system will evolve and to which it will return when
disturbed.
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Figure 1. A Julia Set <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Julia_set_(chartreuse).png>.
Among the earliest and most famous attractors is the one that
Lorenz found while modelling some aspects of atmospheric convec-
tion. In its by now customary representation, it happens to resemble a
butterfly (see Figure 2), which provides another genealogy and mean-
ing of the butterfly effect.67 In this case, the butterfly would be the
symbol less of small external causes having large effects in systems
that are very sensitive to initial conditions and therefore effectively
random than of the robust identity of the system itself, which is drawn
to sets of patterns in a way that is no doubt highly irregular, but still
characteristic and recognizable like the dazzling colours of a butterfly’s
wings.
Combining the two genealogies, the butterfly can symbolize a pro-
found ambivalence of chaotic systems like the global weather system.
On the one hand, it highlights their frailty and instability if even the
flap of a single, frail butterfly can cause or prevent the occurrence of
67 See Robert C. Hilborn, ‘Sea Gulls, Butterflies, and Grasshoppers: A Brief History of
the Butterfly Effect in Nonlinear Dynamics’, American Journal of Physics, 72.4 (2004),
pp. 425–27 (p. 425) <https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1636492>. Lorenz himself remains
agnostic: ‘A number of people with whom I have talked have assumed that the butterfly
effect was named after this attractor. Perhaps it was’ (Lorenz, Essence of Chaos, p. 11).
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Figure 2. The Lorenz Attractor aka Butterfly Attractor
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Lorenz_system_r28_s10_b2-6666.png>.
a storm. But the utter unpredictability resulting from this sensitivity,
which leads to an inextricable entanglement with all elements, is only
half the reason of why the weather behaves as if it had a mind of its
own. Just as importantly, the weather behaves on the other hand in
a manner that is not random but indeed of its own, always moving
towards and along the intricately folded lines of its strange attractor,
which characterizes the weather system and endows it with its own
robust autonomous identity and idiosyncratic dynamic.
According to Lorenz, the strange attractor of the global weather
system is ‘simply the climate’,68 and it imposes an indeed remarkably
68 Lorenz, Essence of Chaos, p. 48.
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stable identity on the weather. While explaining a difficulty in numer-
ical weather simulations, he asks his readers to ‘imagine an enormous
creature from outer space that swoops down close to the earth, reaches
out with a giant paddle, and stirs the atmosphere for a short while
before disappearing’.69 Such a drastic intervention will have violent
effects, of course, but Lorenz maintains that they will quickly dissipate;
the perturbation of the weather will then be ‘hardly detectable and the
weather will be back to normal, although the particular sequence of
weather patterns will undoubtedly not be the one that would have de-
veloped without the disturbance.’70 Clearly, Lorenz was not thinking
of climate change here, but his argument does not deny its possibility
and remains instructive in understanding how one can insist both on
the weather’s resilient autonomy and on its instability, unpredictabil-
ity, and sensitivity: Even after an enormously powerful intervention
from outer space, the weather system quickly returns to ‘normal’ (that
is, to its strange attractor), but at the same time the particular sequence
of weather patterns (where and when a tornado forms, for instance)
remains susceptible to even the most minute interventions.
While much more could be said about chaos theory, its premises,
and consequences, I will conclude by proposing that it can provide
useful models with which to think some of the ambivalences of weath-
ering that the enantiosemic uses of the word have revealed. In par-
ticular, by engaging with profound ambivalences of un/predictability,
im/potency, and dis/entanglement it may help grasp the peculiar kind
of subject evoked when one uses weather verbs and says ‘it storms’,
‘it rains’, ‘it is hot’, or ‘it is cold’. What remains perhaps necessarily
ambivalent is the question of whether the weather as subject anthropo-
morphizes the weather or deflates the notion of a subject. As noted at
the outset, it may be preferable to err on the side of anthropomorphism
and exclude an anthropocentric dualism in which the human (subject)
constitutes itself in opposition to the (nonhuman) elements. Yet blur-
ring all distinctions runs the risk of re-asserting through disavowal an
emphatic autonomous subject with a vengeance, making the subject
omnipotent by considering everything inseparably entangled, denying
69 Ibid., p. 96.
70 Ibid., pp. 96–97.
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the relevance of scale, and allowing for decisionist agential cuts that
determine what comes to matter and what is left to draw on. What
I am suggesting instead is to trouble human exceptionalism through
the peculiar subject of weathering that transpires when weathering is
methodologically situated in both language and physics and grasped in
its generative enantiosemy and ambivalence.
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